Introduction
There seems to be some consensus emerging that women benefit more from European labor market programs than men (e.g. see the survey by Bergemann and van den Berg, 2006) . Our comprehensive evaluation of the Austrian active labor market programs shows that the effect differential disappears once information on pregnancies and parental leave is incorporated.
This is particularly bad news in this specific case, since the programs appear to be ineffective for men.
Many recent European studies have emphasized the role of effect heterogeneity on the program level. 1 In terms of participant heterogeneity Puhani (1999) and Kluve, Lehmann, and Schmidt (1999, 2004) find sex specific program effects for Poland. Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) feature sex differences for the US and other western economies. Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004) look at employment effects for certain subgroups of participants in West Germany. They find effect heterogeneity with respect to residence, previous occupation, and sex. For East Germany, Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2008) find that for some training programs women had much larger employment effects than men. They attributed this heterogeneity to specifics of the selection process that resulted in a higher probability of men being trained with skills for the construction section which then collapsed later. However, such a precise identification of the reason of gender differences is not always possible and the puzzle remains in many other studies. Bergemann and van den Berg (2006) survey the existing literature on effect differentials for men and 1 For job creation schemes in Switzerland see Gerfin and Lechner (2002) . Similar results appear in Lechner and Wunsch (2006) and in Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomson (2004, 2006a,b) for Germany. For wage or integration subsidies in Sweden see Sianesi (2002) and Forslund, Johannson, and Lindqvist (2004) and for Switzerland in Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller (2002) and Gerfin, Lechner, and Steiger (2005) . For business start-up programs in Sweden, we refer to Carling and Gustafson (1999) . For training measures, comprising formal qualification, further training of any kind, and retraining see Richardson and van den Berg (2001) and Carling and Richardson (2004) for Sweden, and Gerfin and Lechner (2002) and Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2005) for Switzerland and Germany. Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004) investigate long-run effects for Germany. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1996) , Hofer and Weber (2004a, b) , and Lutz, Mahringer, and Pöschl (2005) investigate employment effects for different instruments of the Austrian ALMP.
3 women in Europe. The key arguments that are put forward in many studies are gender differences with respect to labor supply elasticity, eagerness to learn, responsiveness to wage changes, and with respect to the larger choice set for women, i.e. including times of parental leave in addition to work and leisure. Their overall conclusion is that labor market programs seem to work better for women in countries where the female labor force participation rate is relatively small, which is also the case in Austria.
Due to a unique and informative data base of the Austrian labor force, we show that those estimated differential between men and women consist probably of two components. The first component is a selection bias due to the lack of controlling for the occurrence of pregnancies before or at the start of the programs, leading to more pregnancies in the group of nonparticipants than in the group of participants. Thus, estimated effects that ignore this information show bias in favor of the programs. Second, the remaining differential in the employment effect appears because program participation decreases or postpones fertility. Once those two components are accounted for, the effect heterogeneity between men and women disappears.
Thus, linking our findings to Bergemann and van den Berg (2006) , we demonstrate that in countries like Austria with a low female labor force participation rate, 2 it is even more important to have information about the outside opportunities of women, in particular times of parental leave.
The underlying data are made available by the Federation of Austrian Social Insurance Institutions and the Austrian Public Employment Service. We possess a rich set of information on the employment history, times of unemployment, the counseling process, personal characteristics, parental leaves, and times of program participation as well as regional characteristics.
Assuming conditional independence of the selection mechanism and potential outcomes, we employ an advanced version of a semi-parametric matching estimator that is very popular in 4 the policy evaluation literature and was used previously, for instance, by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the institutional background of the Austrian labor market policy. Section 3 introduces the underlying data and identification strategy as well as a first description of the population of interest. The estimation method and first results of the program allocation analysis can be found in Section 4. Section 5 shows estimation results and omitted variable checks and Section 6 concludes. Details concerning the data, the estimation method, and results are provided in an internet appendix that can be downloaded from www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner/at.
Labor Market Policies in Austria
The Public Employment Service Act constitutes the legal foundation of the Austrian labor market policy. It determines the objectives of the Public Employment Service by defining the following six principles. (i) The Public Employment Service has to match job seekers and vacancies efficiently, (ii) remove any barrier that prevents this matching, (iii) increase the flow of information about potential matches, (iv) mitigate quantitative and qualitative differences between labor demand and supply, (v) stabilize existing jobs, (vi) and provide funds for the unemployed in case of a job loss. As many other countries, Austria uses active and passive labor market policies to implement those principles.
Passive labor market policy
Passive labor market policy in Austria is designed to cover earnings losses caused by various types of non-employment. To receive unemployment benefit payments the unemployed have to be registered at the Public Employment Service, be eligible and willing to work, and have a 2 Bergemann and van den Berg (2006) classify countries to have a low female labor force participation rate if it is at least 10 percent lower than the male labor force participation rate, which is the case for Austria in 1994 and 2004.
5 predefined record of employment with unemployment insurance contributions. The pre-unemployment employment requirement is a cumulated unemployment insurance contribution period of 52 weeks within the last 24 months for the first draw on benefits. Subsequent benefits require 28 weeks within the previous 12 months. Exceptions regarding age exist. 3 The standard replacement ratio is 55 percent of the former net income and the minimum entitlement period is 20 weeks. Extra payments depending on family status and the number of children may be added. After unemployment benefits expire, the unemployed are entitled to unemployment assistance, if they are still available for work. Unemployment assistance payments are means-tested, but are not subject to a time limit.
Parental leave subsidies
There are three different types of subsidies for women in parental leave. Eight weeks before and after the scheduled confinement women receive so-called confinement benefits, which are granted up to the average net wage of the previous three months. 4 After the expiration of those benefits (and before January 2002), women had to apply for parental leave benefits.
This benefit was granted subject to the same requirements as unemployment benefit, which excluded women who failed to prove the required previous contribution times. 5 After January 2002, women may apply for childcare benefit which is no longer linked to previous contribution times and granted to everyone with an amount of currently 14.53 Euro a day for a maximum period of 30 months. 6 18 months of this entitlement period are counted as regular contribution times to the pension schemes. All periods in which one of those three benefits is 3 The UB claim, for instance, for a 40 year old unemployed person, who paid UI contributions for 312 weeks in the last 120 months, is 39 weeks. See the internet appendix for a summary table of the various exceptions. 4 Unemployed receive a fixed quota of currently 7.42 Euros a day. Multiple births prolong the period after confinement to 12 weeks. 5 The default entitlement period was 549 days, which could be prolonged between July 2001 and December 2002 to provide a gradual adjustment to the childcare benefit regulations. 6 If the parents share child care times, the maximum entitlement period is prolonged to 36 months. If they fail to prove regular medical consultations, childcare benefits are reduces to 7.27 Euros per day. Extra earnings are allowed up to a maximum of 14.600 Euros per year.
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received are recorded in the social security records. Therefore, this information is available in the current study.
2.3
Active labor market policy
Apart from counseling and placement services there are a variety of active labor market programs offered by the Public Employment Service in order to overcome specific reintegration obstacles of the unemployed. 
Data and identification strategy

Data
The three data sources that are used for the program evaluation comprise administrative registers from the Federation of Austrian Social Insurance Institutions, Austrian Public Employment Service, and the program register from the Public Employment Service. We make use of the Austrian population instead of a random sample as is usually the case. Using the population increases computation time considerably, but maximizes precision of our evaluation re-9 sults. For example, due to the resulting large number of observations, it will be possible to non-parametrically estimate program effects fairly precise for various subgroups of participants and programs.
We use the Social Insurance data to obtain information about times in employment (employment states: employed, self-employed or civil servants; with earnings, and employer informa- Most of the data is available on a daily basis, but to condense the information into a manageable form we chose to aggregate the daily information into 2 week intervals (which is of course much more precise than the usual evaluation studies that are commonly based on monthly, quarterly or even yearly information).
However, although this data set is well suited for an evaluation exercise, the nature of the data nevertheless imposes some restrictions with respect to the definition of the participation win-10 dow and the follow-up period which will be discussed in details later on. Furthermore, we have to rely on a quite broad definition of the type of qualification measures 9 .
Identification strategy
In the current analysis we concentrate on the average program effects compared to the state of non-participation. The identification problem in non-experimental program evaluations is that participants in one program differ, sometimes substantially, from potential comparison observations in the non-participation state with respect to characteristics that may influence the outcome variables under inspection as well. Since our data is very informative, but contains no obvious instrumental variable, i.e. a variable that influences the outcome only by the influencing participation decision, we chose the so-called conditional independence assumption (CIA) to overcome the resulting identification problem. It states that if we are able to observe all factors that jointly influence the participation decision and the outcomes, then, conditional on those factors, we can learn the (potential) non-participation outcomes of the participants from the observable non-participation outcomes of the non-participants with the same distribution of characteristics, which identifies our parameter of interest. This identification strategy goes back to Rubin (1974) for the case of comparing participants to nonparticipants. Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) generalize this idea to the case of multiple treatments and provide similar identification conditions. However, the CIA strongly hinges on the availability of a comprehensive set of covariates. To justify its applicability in the present framework, we now discuss three important issues of program allocation, the allocation decision of the caseworker of the Public Employment Service, the willingness and collaboration by the unemployed individual, as well as relevant eligibility criteria in general.
9 All variables that can potentially be used to further distinguish the wide range of qualification measures have bad filling degrees.
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The standard allocation procedure is initially based on a face-to-face interview between the unemployed person and the caseworker. Several aspects, like education, family affairs, past medium-term behavior on the labor market, features of the last employment, and individual program history are discussed. As a result of this interview and in the light of the local characteristics of the labor market the caseworker decides whether or not the unemployed person should be sent into a specific labor market program. The available data contains a large set of covariates that are suitable to map most of those aspects. In addition to variables like age, sex, foreigner status, family status, education, information on the job and the previous sector of employment, we construct a rich set of variables that summarizes the entire labor market history of the unemployed person. This history covers up to 15 years before the actual entry into unemployment under inspection on a fine 2-week scale. We construct variables covering previous times of (un-)employment, program participation, times of childcare, military service, times of non-registration, which we call out-of-labor-force times (OLF) from now on, and the pregnancy status for women. In addition, we use characteristics of the local labor markets relevant for each specific individual.
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From the perspective of the unemployed, all points, mentioned above, certainly play a role for the participation decision. Another component of the individual consideration might be the question whether the currently unemployed person was satisfied with the kind of his/her former job. Since we observe data on the current and the desired profession, we are able to identify or at least approximate this feature. Furthermore, since unemployment insurance contributions are paid during times of program participation, the individual decision might take into account the remaining time of the unemployment benefits. Thus, we also compute the remaining unemployment benefits claim at the time of entry.
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Finally, a key eligibility requirement for participation is being unemployed (whether the individual receives unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance is irrelevant). We will resolve this issue by choosing an adequate inflow of eligibles into unemployment. Overall, we conclude that we are able to pin down most important factors that drive the allocation decision and the potential outcomes. Thus, assuming CIA appears to be credible identification strategy.
Definition of the population and the programs of interest
To be included in our evaluation, programs and the respective participants have to meet five requirements. First, the identification strategy strongly hinges on the existence of a long labor market history before the entry into unemployment. Second, the follow-up period after program attendance should not be influenced by perturbing events like the possibility of (early) retirement. As a result of those arguments we concentrate on the age groups of the labor force between 25 and 50 years which allows us to obtain precise and convincing results. Third, the data must provide all relevant information about the selection into the different labor market programs. Fourth, since we employ non-parametric estimation techniques, the number of observations in the different programs has to be sufficiently large. Finally, we require the program content to be more substantial than the usual counseling process. Under those restrictions, we end up with six program types that can be credibly evaluated: Socio-economic enterprises, non-profit sector projects, job coaching, active job search, qualification measures, and course subsidies. However, we impose a number of further restrictions. Some control variables, like the remaining unemployment insurance benefit claim or the duration in unemployment before the entry into a program require a reference data (artificial program start date) for the nonparticipants. To obtain such a reference date, we employ an approach suggested by Lechner (1999) .
12 Denote this unemployment spell as the 'defining UE spell'.
14 We simulate start dates for the nonparticipants by drawing start dates from the distribution of the participants. If the nonparticipant is not eligible at the simulated reference date, then this nonparticipant is not considered in the evaluation. The fairly drastic reduction in the number of observations is not particularly important though, since (i) participants are in abundant supply, and (ii) they serve only as comparison observations for participants and are not interesting per se. In Austria, temporary layoffs are widely spread. Especially workers in the tourism or construction sector are laid off with a more or less binding reemployment guarantee.
Since such reemployment guarantees may differ substantially with respect to how much binding they are, and since we do not observe such differences that most likely influence participation and labor market outcomes, we require that all persons are laid off permanently.
The age restriction, for reasons described above, is applied as well. Furthermore, we require the duration of the last employment before the inflow into our sample to be longer than 2 months. By means of this, we make sure that prior participants in subsidized employment are not employed further for a couple of days after the end of the program which would cause a short employment spell before becoming unemployed again. We observe that especially the age restriction reduces the number of participants and nonparticipants considerably. The resulting number of observations, however, still allows reliable results from non-parametric estimation.
A descriptive analysis of the selection into the programs
As a first description of the selection process, Table 3 shows mean characteristics by participation status for selected variables. 13 In general, the numbers exhibit many aspects of the institutional environment in Austria as well as the general allocation policy of the Public Employment Service. Except for socio-economic enterprises and active job search the fraction of 13 The entire set of variables that are used in the estimation part of this paper is available from the internet appendix. For programs specifically designed for unemployed with certain reintegration obstacles, like socio economic enterprises, non-profit sector projects and job coaching, we observe a fraction of disabled participants of almost 22 percent which is nearly three times higher than for active job search and more than two times higher than for qualification measures and course subsidies. Participants of socio economic enterprises are also on average the oldest and the ones with the shortest mean duration in childcare. This distinction between programs for unemployed with stronger reintegration problems on the one hand and programs for unemployed with ´usual´ reintegration problems on the other hand can be observed in many dimensions.
For the former group we observe predominantly participants with compulsory schooling (9 years) as the highest education level, jobs in the production and construction sector, higher average times in unemployment, shorter durations of the last employment spell and a lower overall fraction in employment over the entire observation period in the data. Furthermore, those participants have much lower remaining benefit claims at the time of program entry and lower past earnings.
remaining benefit duration at program entry, different aspects of the labor market history, and times of child care, program history and a set of regional indicators. A peculiarity that is observed for all program groups is that 15-23 percent of the participants attended a program of the same kind in a previous unemployment spell. Active job search measures, primarily used to endow participants with special job application and interview skills, are also used as a screening instrument for long-term unemployed in order to renew and tighten the contact to the local Public Employment Service office. This is also reflected in Table 3 since participants in active job search live in regions with a higher average fraction of long-term unemployment. It can be observed that non-profit sector projects and job coaching are rarely used in the state of Vienna compared to the rest of Austria. In terms of employment in the follow up period after the program we find that participants in socio-economic enterprises, non-profit sector projects and job coaching have considerably lower employment rates one year after the program start, which is not surprising given program lengths of up to one year. Participants in shorter programs exhibit higher employment rates. Overall, participants catch up after two or three years. 
Econometric methodology
As discussed before, the identification of the program effects hinges on the existence of the variables that jointly influence program participation and potential outcomes. For every comparison of different program states (including nonparticipation) the estimation strategy is to form comparison groups that do not differ from the respective program groups with respect to the distribution of those conditioning variables. We employ an advanced version of a semiparametric two stage propensity score matching approach. This class of estimators is popular in the program evaluation literature, because it allows for individual effect heterogeneity while not requiring a parametric specification for the relation of the outcome variable and the variables used for the selection bias correction. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if the CIA holds, given all relevant covariates, then it also holds for a scalar function of those covariates (balancing score property). Hence, a first-step procedure estimates conditional program participation probabilities (propensity scores). The advantage is that the construction of control groups can be done on the basis of the propensity score. Those points are discussed in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) and Imbens (2004) for the binary treatment and in Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) for the multiple treatment case.
We model the propensity score for every comparison by means of binary probit models for men and women separately. The results give further insights into the program allocation of the caseworkers. 14 Despite the existence of considerable heterogeneity, some general determinants 19 of program participation versus nonparticipation appear. For both sexes we find a positive relation of participation to disability, desiring a vocational change, longer durations of the defining unemployment spell, and having higher average durations in past employment. Jobs in the law and administration and trade sector tend to increase the probability of being promoted in active job search, qualification measures and course subsidies. Being a foreigner, having a university (entrance) degree, as well as a previous occupation in the service sector decreases (if at all) the participation probability. For women, we find that the months of pregnancy reduce the participation probability for all programs, except socio-economic enterprises. The overall previous time spent in parental leave prior to the defining unemployment spell under consideration reduces the participation probability for non-profit sector projects, job coaching, and active job search, but increases the one for course subsidies. For men, we find that having no vocational degree increases the probability of participating in socio-economic enterprises, non-profit sector projects, and active job search, but decreases the one for participating in course subsidies. The remaining picture is less clear-cut and summarized in Table 4 .
To obtain the final estimates of the program effects, we use the extended propensity score matching procedure as proposed by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004) . First, they allow for more than one good match, if available, by incorporating the idea of caliper matching as in Dehejia and Wahba (2002) . Second, they incorporate a bias correction procedure to account for small mismatches of the matching step by exploiting the double robustness property as discussed in Rubin (1979) and Joffe, et al. (2004) . For more information on this approach and a detailed matching protocol see Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004) . Note: We estimate probit models for the selection into the different programs compared to the state of nonparticipation (the first six columns) and compared to participation in another program, but only within program group 1 and 2, respectively (last six columns). We do not report the value of the coefficients, since they are only identified up to scale and thus not comparable between the different models. + (-) denotes that the respective variable has a positive (negative) influence on the participation probability that is significant on the 5% level. Reading example 1: For the selection of women into job coaching (JC) compared to non-participation, we find a positive influence of the disability status on the probability of participating in JC. Reading example 2: For the selection of men into active job search (AJS) compared to non-participation, we find that the wish for a vocational change increases the probability of participating in AJS.
5.
Results
Program effects by gender
The following figures illustrate program effects for participants in one program (listed at the top of each figure) compared to nonparticipation. The follow-up period relevant for outcome measurements starts at the day of program entry and ends three years later. Effects are estimated monthly as differences of percentage points for all outcome variables. 15 If symbols appear on the different lines (denoting the program effects), it means that the respective effects are statistically different from zero at the 95 percent level. Recall that the matching step is done on the basis of propensity scores that are estimated for men and women separately.
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The two graphs in the first row of Figure 2 show employment effects of participating in socioeconomic enterprises, non-profit sector projects, and job coaching. Common to all graphs of Figure 2 are negative employment effects for all programs right after the start, which is commonly labeled as lock-in effect (see van Ours 2004, among others). The intuition is that participants reduce their search intensity while being in a program and therefore re-enter less frequently into regular employment than non-participants. There are differences in the progression of the curves for men and women. For women, we observe that socio-economic enterprises seem to increase the employment probability of the participants by 9 percent after three years. For qualification measures and course subsidies, presented in the second panel of Figure 2 , we find small positive effects at the very end of the follow-up period of about 2.5 percent for women. 17 For male participants we do not find any positive effect for any programs. Qualification measures even seem to harm the respective participants three years after 15 The outcome variable is also listed in the top line of every panel. 16 Note that we additionally deleted all individuals who received financial support right before the (hypothetical) entry into the program which had only marginal impact on the population size. See the internet appendix for details. 17 Note that it is possible to estimate fairly small effects (below 5 %-points) due to the larger number of participants in the programs collected in group two. Such small effects could not be identified non-parametrically before since comparable studies usually rely on (smaller) samples instead of using the population as is done here.
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program start. So despite the generally negative picture about the effects of the Austrian active labor market policies, it seems at least that this study, so far, strengthens the argument that women tend to have an effect premium for certain labor market programs. 
Where do the positive effects for women come from?
Previous studies, like Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004) , showed that usually the positive employment effects are not achieved by reducing the rate of registered unemployed participants, but by increasing their labor force attachment, i.e. by reducing the rate of participants leaving the labor force. Therefore, Figure 3 shows the program effects on times out of the labor force (OLF, defined as not being employed and not being registered as unemployed) in the current study. All programs reduce times in OLF. Comparing both sexes, especially in the lower panel of Figure 3 , we find the reduction of OLF to be higher for women than for men. Using a unique feature of our data, we disaggregate this effect further. Figure 4 shows the program effects on times of parental leave for men and on times of parental leave plus pregnancy (PP) for 24 women. 19 For women, we find significant negative effects on PP for job coaching, qualification measures, and course subsidies. The result is rather striking. Three years after program start we do not find any significant effect for any program type, neither for men nor for women. Moreover, we observe that the relative dominance of the women melted down towards zero. It appears that the only remaining difference appears for qualification measures with significant negative effects for men and insignificant effects for women. Hence, we do not find substantial effect premia for women as soon as we incorporate times of PP. The premia in Figure 2 appeared because female non-26 participants take an additional outside opportunity, i.e. becoming a mother, which leads to comparably low employment rates for this pool of women. Men are much less affected by such issues and we therefore observe only the program effect, which is zero in most cases.
From a policy maker perspective, the valuation of the results is ambiguous. If additional kids are considered as desirable as employment, then the programs are ineffective. If not, then the increase in the employment effect for women at the cost of reducing or postponing fertility may be desirable and considered as a 'positive' outcome of the active labor market policies. Due to the large size of the population in this study, it is possible to stratify female participants further, i.e. per age group, to get a clearer picture of the underlying heterogeneity relating to this effect. Thus, we divide all women into two age groups, below and above 40 years, to separate two groups that differ with respect to individual family plans. Doing so, 97.6 percent of all pregnancies just before the hypothetical program start are in the lower age group.
Due to population size restrictions, we consider the three larger programs only, active job search, qualification measures, and course subsidies. Figure 7 shows that splitting the female population according to age, we observe that the positive effect for course subsidies can be attached to women younger than 40 years. For this group we observe that all programs have a negative effect on PP. For the older segment in turn, we do not observe such effects. Overall, for both age groups we fail to detect positive effects once we take employment plus PP as the outcome variable. This confirms our result 28 that small positive effects, here for course subsidy, only appear because participation increases the attachment to the labor force. In contrast, eligible non-participants subsequently chose to put more emphasis on family planning, which leads to lower employment rates compared to those participants they have been matched to.
Pregnancy bias -a sensitivity check for omitted variables
As became clear in the previous section, one important feature of this study is that we use information on parental leave and pregnancies as an outcome variable as well as for correcting for potential selection bias, as pregnant women are rarely observed in labor market programs. Thus, if this variable is not controlled for, it is likely that a larger share of pregnant women appears in the group of nonparticipants which will bias the employment effects up-
wards. Now, we analyze the size of this bias by comparing our results to results that would have been obtained without that information. First, we do not delete persons who are in parental leave right before the (hypothetical) program entry and, second, we leave out the month of pregnancy from the selection model. Figure 8 summarizes the results.
Obviously, the results for men are not affected by this change since parental leave is a minor issue here. For women, all effects increase by approximately 2-3 percent compared to Figure   2 . For socio-economic enterprises this results in a wider range of significant positive effects, especially at the end of the follow-up period. For active job search, qualification measures, and course subsidies we now observe significant positive effects that are stable from the middle of the follow-up period onwards. According to these estimation results we would conclude that we find clear evidence of positive effects for women for four out of six labor market programs, which is highly misleading given the results in the previous sections. To wrap up, we find two important impacts of the observability of times of parental leave.
First, by constructing the pregnancy status for women, it removes a remaining omitted variable bias. Second, it can be used to interpret program effects in the follow-up period.
Conclusion
This study provides an econometric evaluation of several important active labor market programs in Austria. Large and informative administrative data is used to control for potential selection problems. As a particular advantage of the data, we identify times of pregnancy and parental leave. For women, this information turns out to be very important for reducing selection bias as well as for understanding the effects of the programs.
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For men, we find the programs to be generally ineffective in increasing unsubsidized employment. However, without controlling for pregnancy status, most programs appear to be effective in increasing employment prospects for women. Those effects become smaller once the pregnancy information is taken into account, but they are still there. A closer investigation
shows that the programs increase female employment by reducing the share of women leaving the labor force. The underlying mechanism is that the programs reduce the pregnancy rate of the participants. Once that effect is subtracted from the employment effects, almost all gender differences disappear.
Our findings about the gender differences may explain results appearing in the survey by Bergemann and van den Berg (2006) . They find that women's effect premia predominantly occur in countries with a low female work force participation indicating that times for childcare and labor market participation are less compatible or exclusive. We demonstrate for the case of Austria that it is important to have information about the outside opportunities of women, like times of parental leave. The puzzle of women's effect premia might be partially explained by the fact that important confounders (and outcome measures), like the ones discussed above,
have not been available in other studies.
The question whether our results for women -a positive employment effect and a zero effect on the fertility plus employment outcome -indicate that the definition of a program success depends on the valuation of the policy makers. If additional (or earlier) kids are considered as desirable as employment, then the programs are ineffective. If employment is considered more important, then the increase in the employment effect for women at the cost of reducing or postponing fertility may be desirable and considered as a 'positive' outcome of the Austrian active labor market policies. This conclusion is most likely true not only for Austria, but for many other European countries as well.
